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Much of Book II is very real and the serious student will gain from examining it.

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DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY, ETC. Written by many hands and edited by James Mark Baldwin, Ph. D., etc., etc., Stuart Professor in Princeton University, with the co-operation and assistance of an international board of consulting editors; in three volumes, with illustrations and extensive bibliographies. Quarto. Vol. I., pp. xxiv., 643. New York and London: Macmillan, 1901.

The task of making a useful dictionary of philosophy is probably one of the most difficult that an author or a company of authors can undertake. The width of the subject and the indefiniteness of its limits render almost insoluble the problem of rightly selecting the topics and treating them in due proportion. Past experience has also tended to make one sceptical regarding the success of any new attempt; for while most of the previous dictionaries have occasional utility and some peculiar merits, none of them can be implicitly trusted, and all of them, in one way or another, seriously mislead the unwary reader. Many faults of the older dictionaries are, however, due to the fact that each of them is mainly the work of one man. This new book is "written by many hands," and one's expectation is consequently renewed. Yet a perusal of the first volume leaves me with a scepticism shaken, but not removed. It may yet be possible to produce a fairly satisfactory dictionary of philosophy (including metaphysics, logic, ethics and æsthetics), and another fairly satisfactory dictionary of psychology (including various allied sciences). But the present work seems to me to fail in the attempt to combine the two. So far as I am competent to judge, philosophy suffers most. It practically becomes ancillary to psychology and the whole work should be entitled rather "a dictionary of psychology and philosophy" than "a dictionary of philosophy and psychology." To many people this may appear right and proper; but it is a view which I cannot accept. It expresses, however, in another way the statement of the editor in his preface that "it is upon the psychology of this work that most of its lines converge; and it is in its psychology that many of the hopes

of its producers centre." Some such criticism as I have indicated is accepted by Professor Baldwin as "inevitable." It might have been unnecessary to make it, had he given the book a different title.

The two main objects of the dictionary are (as it is put in the preface), "first, that of doing something for the thinking of the time in the way of definition, statement, and terminology; and, second, that of serving the cause of education in the subjects treated." As to terminology, the purpose of the writers is not to introduce new terms or new meanings, but to understand and define existing terms and meanings, and at the same time "to interpret the movements of thought through which the meanings thus determined have arisen, with a view to discovering what is really vital in the development of thought and term in one." In the execution of this purpose an attempt is made to secure authority for the definitions of terms and for their equivalents in various languages by obtaining a consensus of opinion from experts in America, England, France, Germany and Italy. This is a most useful feature of the work, and has a special value as regards the psychological and more strictly scientific subjects. Philosophy proper lends itself less easily to such a treatment; because philosophical terms or meanings do not become negligible or of purely historical interest, when they are no longer used, and because philosophical meanings must inevitably vary with individual thinkers, on account of their organic place in particular systems. No consensus of experts can fix them, and nothing short of a full historical statement can be an adequate account of them. Such a historical statement is not attempted in this dictionary. "It would be useless," says Professor Baldwin, "to attempt in any compass, short of an independent work as large as this, to make a dictionary of Greek and Scholastic Philosophy. It should be done; it is much needed; but we have not attempted it." This is true, not merely of Greek and Scholastic Philosophy, but of philosophy as a whole, and while the present dictionary contains accounts (useful so far as they go), of Kantian and Hegelian terminology, it is perhaps on the historical side that it is on the whole most deficient. "This work is not, and does not include, a history of philosophy." But as philosophy is inseparable from its history, the philosophical value of the book is correspondingly small. It might, I think, have been con-

siderably greater had the proportions of space allotted to the various subjects been different.

Of the educational value of the dictionary it is not easy to judge. Experience of its use by students is the only adequate test, and for that we must wait. Meanwhile it may be said that it contains a vast mass of useful information, usually, though not always, accurate, and in the main expressed clearly and simply. In this last respect, however, the writers differ considerably. Some of the articles are admirable in their order, lucidity and relevance. Others are careless and even ungrammatical in expression, and some are so far from being educationally valuable that even a reader with some little knowledge of the subject will find them difficult to understand. The references to the literature of the subject are an important educational feature of the book. These, however, vary very much in fulness and accuracy of reference, some being models of what such things should be, while others are so general as to be of comparatively slight use. On the whole it may be said that educationally, as in other respects, the dictionary is valuable mainly for the student of psychology, especially on its physiological side.

As to the proportion of space allotted to the various subjects I have to some extent already indicated my opinion. To be more specific, it seems to me in the first place, that *Æsthetics*, which gets as large a space as *Logic*, has been too liberally treated. The article on *Art and Art-theories* is considerably longer than that on *Ethical Theories*, and there is a still longer article on *Beauty and the Beautiful*, which is also concerned mainly with *æsthetic theories*. While these and similar articles are interesting and useful in themselves, they might well have been shortened in order to make room for a fuller account of the metaphysical systems and their terminology. Again, the space given to the *Philosophy of Religion* is still more disproportionate. Many of the articles have only the remotest reference to philosophy or psychology: some have no such reference at all. Take for instance the article "*Annunciation*," which discusses historically the date of *Lady-day* and which, though it is not very long, is actually longer than the article on *Ancestor-worship*. If the editor had observed that there is probably no department of human knowledge so well equipped as *theology* with books of reference (encyclopedias, dictionaries, carefully indexed histories), he might have ruled out a great number of imperfect articles on points of *Christian*

dogma, reduced many others to a line or two of reference and utilized the space that remained for matters of greater philosophical importance. Yet again, the bare little biographies scattered through the volume occupy a good deal of space, and are not of much practical use. Had they included some account of the work of their subjects or their special claim to philosophic or scientific fame, they would have been valuable. Occasionally some such reference is made, but with a curious infelicity the feature remarked upon is usually one of subordinate importance. For instance, the biography of Bayle has no reference to his great Dictionary. Bruno's acceptance of the Copernican theory is the only view of his that is mentioned, Buffon's translation of Newton is recorded, but there is no reference to his own great work, of Gassendi's philosophy we are merely told that "in some respects it resembles Locke's," and so on indefinitely.

These remarks on the general features of the book are not intended to be a condemnation of it as a whole. No reader can fail to be impressed by the amount of work that has been expended upon it and by the excellence of the great mass of its articles. But I have no doubt that its editor and his associates will be more grateful for some suggestions of correction and improvement than for a few vague paragraphs of praise. In proceeding to discuss the book in detail, I must therefore say once for all that the motive of my criticisms is a desire to make the book better and that it appears to me to be both worthy and capable of improvement.

If the biographies are retained, the number of them should be considerably increased. In view of the names already included, those which follow have occurred to me as worthy of a place and the list might no doubt easily be extended, for I have made no attempt to be exhaustive: Alcmaeon, Austin, Bagehot, Balguy, Bodin, Boscovich, DesBosses, Burke, Cardan, Carlyle, Culverwel, Dionysius the Areopagite, Epicharmus, Euler, de la Forge, Foucher, Foucher de Careil, Glanvil, Goethe, Hegesias, Van Helmont, Herschel, Hippocrates, Huet, Huyghens, Lamenais, Laplace, Lardner, Lavater. In the biographies actually given a number of corrections should be made. Albinus is not a part of the name of Alcuin, but a pen-name of his, and the Latin form of his name is Alcuinus, not Alcinus. Anaximenes is misprinted for Anaximenes, and Andronicus Rhodus for A. Rhodius. Greek

names should be printed either in the customary English form or by a proper transliteration. "Arkesilaus," *e. g.*, should be either Arcesilaus or Arkesilaos. "Kratylus" should be either Cratylus, or Kratylos. "Kritias" should be put under C. if Callisthenes, Carpocrates, etc., are to appear there. In short, some uniform plan should be adopted, and for most readers the English spelling will be the more convenient of the two.

On particular biographies some further notes may be made. Archelaus of Miletus was not "probably" the teacher of Socrates. (v. Zeller, "Socrates and the Socratic Schools," Eng. Trans., p. 66). Baynes was not "professor of logic at Edinburgh, 1851-55." Was the Utilitarian formula first used by Cumberland? If so, some reference should be given, as Hutcheson is usually credited with it. I doubt whether Boetius is an allowable variant of Boethius. In the article on Buffon, for "1835" and "1839" read "1735" and "1739." Butler took orders in 1718. Reference should be made to his "Sermons" as well as to his "Analogy," and his appointment as Preacher at the Rolls is more worthy of note than some of the other posts which are mentioned. About Chrysippus something better might be given than the absurd and improbable story about the ass and the figs. Two biographies of Cratylus are given, one under the heading "Kratylus." Was Democritus called the laughing philosopher "for his cheerful disposition," and not rather because of his ethical precepts? Erigena was not Johannes, but Joannes and his pantheism is not at all "vague." Marsiglio Ficino is in Latin, Marsilius, not Marsiglius. Of Hartley it is said that he "sought to explain mental facts by physiological," but no mention is made of association. Heraclitus was not *born* about 500 B. C., but *floruit* about that time. The title of his work is not known, and it is doubtful whether it had any. If Democritus is mentioned as the "laughing," Heraclitus ought to get his title of "weeping" philosopher. It is more probable that Herbert of Cherbury was born in 1583 than in 1581; and his birthplace was certainly Eyton in Shropshire, and not Montgomery Castle in North Wales. In the same article "Oranien" should be "Orange," "1616" should be "1618" and "1625" should be "1624." Ben Jonson is hardly to be described as "one of the leading thinkers" of Hobbes' day. "The Court of Sessions" should be the "Court of Session," (p. 483b). "Iamblicus" should be "Iamblichus," and "Lasalle" should be "Lassalle."

My notes on the other articles may be conveniently given in alphabetical order. The article "Ability and Inability (in theology)" is practically duplicated under "Inability," and the quotation (without specific reference), from the Westminster Confession is inaccurately given. Why should ability be derived from "A + habilis" and not from "habilis" simply? "Absolute" is defined as "that which is not relative," while in the next column reference is made to the "relatively absolute." Absolute freedom, again, is not necessarily "undetermined" and Pantheism represents (2) as well as (1) of the "three great connotations" of the absolute. Reference should also be made to "absolute motion" and "absolute position" in the mathematical sense. "Abstract Idea" is good, but historically defective, and reference should be made to Locke. "Acroamatic" is used (*e. g.* by Leibniz and others) not merely with reference to Aristotle. "Adequate" is too vague in its historical references, and the statement about Spinoza is inaccurate. "Adiaphoristic controversy" should be omitted as having nothing to do with the philosophy of religion, and the same may be said regarding the date of advent. "Adoptionism" is much too long (twice as long as "Altruism" in ethics), and the half of "Anabaptists" might be omitted. "A fortiori" is defined in such a way as to omit the important point. An argument *a fortiori* is not a "more conclusive" argument. Under "Agnosticism (in theology)" some reference should have been made to the "negative theology" of early mediæval times. "Alexandrian School" is very vague and inadequate as regards the doctrines of the various writers. Plotinus, *e. g.* is merely mentioned and there is no account of his views or of those of Porphyry. Regarding Iamblichus also we get practically no information, although his biography refers us to this article. And it is surely most inaccurate to say that "Boethius is the last eminent thinker to be affected by" Neo-Platonism. Under "Algorism (and, erroneously, Algorithm)" the use of Algorithm in logic should be explained, and a reason should be given for describing it as "erroneous." Kant's "Analogies of Experience" are twice explained. The first article translates (with a general reference to the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"!) a phrase chosen by Eisler, which is far from being the best definition that might have been selected. The next sentence is inaccurate; but the fact is correctly stated in the second article. The first article should be omitted and the literature mentioned under it should

be added to the second article. The term "Analogon rationis" is not "used by Leibniz" in the passages mentioned by Eisler, to whom the Dictionary article refers us, and I doubt if it is used by him at all. While "Analytic and Synthetic judgment" is on the whole well and clearly done, Professor Baldwin's part of it seems to me to be in various respects unsatisfactory, and here, as in many of the other articles, the distinction between the logical and the psychological aspects of the question is not made sufficiently clear. "Ancestor Worship" is quite inadequate, when compared, *e. g.*, with "Animism" and similar articles. "Animism in philosophy" is much too vague and indefinite. "Anthropology" is on the whole well done; but it contains the curious statement that "the term was used by Aristotle, but somewhat inexactly." The term does not occur in Bonitz's Index, and the only word resembling it is ἀνθρώπου λόγος—"one whose conversation is personal." It should be noted also that Kant, in his definition of Anthropology, includes its physiological, as well as its psychological, side. The definition of "Anticipations of experience" is much less clear than it might be, and a meaningless reference is given to "Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 103," no edition being mentioned. The reference seems to have been taken from Eisler, who apparently means to refer to Kehrbach's edition (Reclam) and misprints 103 for 163. This is a very bad case of unverified reference, and it is not the only one in the Dictionary. In matters of this kind a dictionary, if it is to be serviceable, ought to be above suspicion. It is impossible for a reviewer to verify all the references in so large a book, and a few such cases are enough to shake one's confidence in the whole work. In "Apprehension," again p. 63*a*), the references to Aristotle's "Metaph." should be viii., 10, instead of ii., 10, and xi., 7, instead of xii., 7. "Arche," in Aristotle (p. 66*b*) is wrongly defined and ought to have had much fuller treatment. The idea of "Archetype" may be in Plato; but it is not "a Platonic word." "Architectonic" refers us to "Architecture," and "Architecture" refers us again to "Classification of the Fine Arts;" but in neither of these articles is the word "architectonic" used. And no reference is made to the classical usage of the term in Plato and Aristotle. "Art and Art theories" is in many respects a useful article; but its account of Plato's view and of the use of his term "imitation" is very imperfect, and one misses some account of the historical meanings of the term "Art," *e. g.*, the difference between the

usage of Plato and Aristotle, and that of modern times. "Asceticism in religion" might be omitted as it does little more than repeat some things which have been said in the excellent general article which precedes it. "Aseitas" should not be defined as if it were an adjective. "Assent" should have had a reference to Newman, or at least a cross reference to "Belief." The "Assistance or Concurrence of God" is not connected merely with the Pre-established Harmony. Its meaning for Descartes, at least, should be mentioned. "Association of ideas" and "Associationism" are brief, but clear so far as they go. There should, however, have been some more definite reference to the "laws of Association." "Atheism" is not defined, unless "pancosmism" is to be taken as a definition of it—*obscurum per obscurius*. And it is surely unfair to the Ritschlians to suggest that they regard God as "a subjective phenomenon" (p. 84*b*). Under "Âtman" reference is made to "the Aristotelian expression, 'Soul is the primary reality of organism.'" If this is intended as a translation of Aristotle's well-known definition, it is in various ways unsatisfactory. "Attribute" is defined as "an essential characteristic of a being," and it is said to be "used in this sense by the scholastics as a translation of the Aristotelian *συνμμεβηχδς*." If this is the case, it should certainly be mentioned that Aristotle's *συνμμεβηχδς* is not "an essential characteristic." "Authority ought to have included some account of the more important historical discussions of the question. It is strange that in a dictionary of philosophy we should not find some treatment of the history of a question like this, while we have historical references to controversies about the date of an ecclesiastical feast or fast. Under "Automatic and Automatism" (otherwise an excellent article) some reference should be made to the "spiritual automata" of Spinoza and Leibnitz. "Arymites" might be omitted, as having nothing to do with philosophy.

As this review is already a long one, the remainder of my notes must be reserved for a second notice. One can hardly write a useful review of so large a dictionary without going into considerable detail.

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